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Abstract 
In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) set a goal of paying small business contractors 
within 15 days of invoice receipt rather than the standard 30 days. In 2012, other federal 
agencies also set a goal of accelerated payments to small businesses, and all agencies later 
expanded this goal to include all contractors regardless of size. We study whether small 
businesses benefited from these accelerated payment goals. Using a difference-in-difference 
design, we find that small business participation in government contracts rose following the 
setting of accelerated payments goals. Importantly, contracts for perishable foods and 
construction services, which were unaffected by the new accelerated payments policies, did 
not see an increase in small business participation. We also find that the benefits of 
accelerated payments are concentrated among small businesses with a backlog of ongoing 
projects. This is consistent with the hypothesis that accelerated payments alleviate the 
liquidity constraints that may be particularly acute for small businesses. 
Introduction 
The federal government has long been interested in supporting small businesses. An 
often-used policy lever is the intentional purchasing of goods and services from smaller, as 
opposed to larger, businesses, commonly by setting aside prime contracts for small 
businesses or by requiring that prime contractors utilize small business subcontractors. 
However, simply directing more purchases toward small business may not be sufficient on 
its own if other challenges that are faced by these firms are not addressed. Credit 
constraints are one such challenge. Access to credit could be costly, and small businesses 
often do not have sufficient cash reserves to smooth short-term liquidity requirements. Cash 
constraints may, therefore, limit the amount of business that can be undertaken by small 
contractors, and this will limit the effectiveness of programs meant to increase small 
business purchases. 
One specific difficulty that contributes to the cash crunch faced by small businesses 
is the mismatch between when firms incur costs and when they receive payments for the 
goods and services provided. One way to improve the cash flow of small businesses is to 
reduce the amount of time between when goods and services are provided and when 
payment from the government for those goods and services is received. Accelerated 
payments have recently received substantial interest, with several federal policy actions 
calling for the acceleration of payments to small business contractors. In this report, our 
objective is to evaluate whether small businesses performed better when payments were 
accelerated, which we measured by the degree of participation by small businesses as 
prime contractors in federal procurement. 
In 2011, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced a policy of accelerated 
payments to small business contractors. Under this policy, payment to small businesses 
occurs within 15 days of the receipt of invoice, rather than the standard 30-day payment 
period. Over the months following the initial announcement, the DoD phased in the policy 
into its major payments systems beginning in June 2011 with the DoD’s largest payment 
system, the Mechanization of Contract Administration Services (MOCAS) system. The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in September 2011 outlined a goal to pay invoices 
within 15 days for all federal procurement. The policy of accelerated payments was later 
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expanded to include all prime contractors regardless of size. Neither the DoD, nor the 
broader federal policy, altered the penalties the government faced for late payment; these 
penalties continued to only be incurred after the standard 30-day payment period. While it is 
clear that the DoD implemented the accelerated payments policy as intended, we are 
uncertain about the extent to which the other federal agencies complied with the OMB’s 
directive to apply accelerated payments for all federal procurement. 
To evaluate whether accelerated payments achieve the goal of positively impacting 
small businesses, we utilize data from the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS), which 
contains the universe of nonclassified federal contract actions. These data do not contain 
information regarding direct measures of firm success such as employment, investment, or 
profits. Instead, we examine whether participation by small business prime contractors 
increased when accelerated payments were in place. While this is an indirect measure, as 
we discuss in more detail, this is an appropriate measure of the benefits to small businesses 
from accelerated payments. One reason is that encouraging small business participation is, 
in itself, often a goal of procurement policy. Moreover, economic theory suggests that by 
examining participation we can provide indirect evidence about whether small business 
performance is aided by accelerated payments. This is for two reasons. First, small 
businesses are more willing to enter the competition for contracts if they benefit from 
accelerated payments. Second, conditional on entry, they will be willing and able to bid more 
competitively to win the contract. 
Our empirical approach utilizes the change in accelerated payments policy over time, 
as well as the differential impact that accelerated payments have on affected relative to 
unaffected products. Not all products were affected, since the payment period for 
construction contracts and for some food products was already less than 15 days. Contracts 
for these products were, therefore, unaffected by accelerated payments. The empirical 
approach is a difference-in-difference design, where we consider the change in the number 
of contracts awarded to the average small business after the implementation of accelerated 
payments to the similar change for the average large business. Furthermore, this differential 
change for small versus large firms can be compared between affected and unaffected 
products, since contracts for construction services and many types of food products already 
had payment periods of less than 15 days. The appeal of this approach is that it can control 
for a myriad of factors that affect small businesses at a given time, so long as those 
economy-wide shocks similarly affect firms that provide affected and unaffected products. It 
can also account for changes over time that might affect all firms, both large and small. 
Early payment receipt can help small businesses in several ways. First, accelerated 
payments increase the present value of contract payments, which results in a small benefit 
to contractors. Second, and likely more importantly, accelerated payments help the cash 
flow of a business. Prime contractors have obligations to their subcontractors and other 
suppliers and must manage the cash flow necessary to make on-time payments. Either 
suitable cash reserves, or lines of credit, must be maintained to meet short-term obligations. 
Firms may face borrowing constraints that limit their ability to meet short-term needs, 
necessitating holding cash reserves. This constraint may be particularly acute for small 
businesses, which have less access to both external and internal capital, which could be a 
barrier to taking on new work on top of ongoing projects. Accelerating payments could, 
therefore, assist small businesses in participating in government procurement and in 
supporting their growth. Encouraging small business participation and growth may, in fact, 
be cost effective for the government, as current small businesses become future, possibly 
more efficient, competitors. 
For two similar reasons, helping small businesses through accelerated payments 
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could be costly. First, the present value of contract payments is higher under accelerated 
payments. Given the favorable terms of federal borrowing, this is a lesser issue for 
government agencies than it is for the seller, though in the aggregate the impact is 
nontrivial. To get a sense of the scale of this cost, consider the thought exercise of 
advancing the payment on all DoD contracts by 2 weeks.1 DoD contracts in 2017 were 
worth $320 billion, and advancing the payment on these contracts by 2 weeks increases the 
present value of this expenditure by around $300 million.2 Second, the procuring agency 
must itself also manage cash flow, and the DoD has raised concern that the expansion of 
accelerated payments has created cash constraints for some defense activities. Such 
constraints may pose a greater challenge for agencies than the increase in the present 
value of contract payments. 
This report proceeds as follows. In the Literature Review section, we review the 
evidence regarding small businesses and government programs to assist them. We then 
describe the accelerated payments policies and the time line of their adoption in the section 
titled Accelerated Payments Policy. The next section contains a description of the data used 
in this study. Then, we provide a model that motivates the empirical specifications. Next, we 
specify our empirical approach and present the results. Finally, we provide our conclusion. 
Literature Review 
It is often argued that small businesses are important because of their role as job 
creators and innovators (Birch, 1979) and because entrepreneurship is a potential pathway 
out of poverty (Glazer & Moynihan, 1970). Based on these arguments, lawmakers often 
enact public policies meant to help small businesses, commonly through public procurement 
programs that steer contracts or by providing terms that are particularly favorable to small, 
rather than large, businesses. The efficacy of these policies rests (1) on their ability to 
address the factors that contribute to the success of small businesses and (2) the cost that 
the policies impose on the government. Our research fits within a robust literature in 
economics, which examines the factors that influence the success of small businesses and 
entrepreneurship as well as the subset of this literature that examines the costs and benefits 
of small business policies implemented via public procurement. Such policies may target 
small businesses generally, or they may take the form of affirmative action programs 
specifically intended to benefit minority- and women-owned enterprises. 
Several factors may influence entrepreneurial activity and the formation, expansion, 
and survival of small businesses. Liquidity is a key constraint faced by small businesses, as 
it determines the access to capital needed to start a business and to meet short-run cash 
flow needs. It is also, therefore, closely related to accelerated payments. Fairlie and 
Krashinsky (2012) documented that easing liquidity constraints significantly boosts 
entrepreneurship. Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994) and Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (2005) also found 
 
1 We do not attempt a cost–benefit analysis in this report. A proper measure of the cost of the 
program would require data on exactly how much more quickly payments were made. These data exist 
but are not publicly available. A proper measure of benefits would require dynamic estimates of how 
firm survival and efficiency may positively impact the operation of the procurement market. As we 
discuss in the conclusion, this is outside of the scope of our research. 
 
2 This is likely an overstatement of the costs of the program that we consider for two reasons. First, the 
accelerated payments policies we consider here are not expected to affect contracts for food or 
construction, which indicates that less than $320 billion in DoD contracts were impacted. Second, 
compliance may not have been complete, signaling that some payments that should have been accelerated 
were, in fact, not accelerated. 
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similar effects of liquidity on entrepreneurs. 
Most firms that qualify for minority- and women-owned business subsidies are small 
businesses, and so the constraints faced by these firms will be highly relevant for small 
business policy. Fairlie and Robb (2007) studied minority-owned enterprises and examined 
the factors that contribute to the disparities in business outcomes experienced by these 
firms compared to white-owned firms. Related to the role of liquidity in small business 
success, they found that these disparities are influenced by access to startup capital. Black-
owned businesses may face lending discrimination, as found by Blanchflower et al. (2003) 
and Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2005) and may also have less family wealth (Bates, 1997). 
The costs and benefits of small business subsidies and affirmative action 
implemented through public procurement have been examined by several authors. Chatterji 
et al. (2014) examined the effects of affirmative action in city contracting on minority 
entrepreneurship, and Marion (2011) studied how affirmative action affects government 
purchases from minority- and women-owned enterprises. Nakabayashi (2013) examined the 
set-aside of government contracts for small enterprises in Japan, finding that approximately 
40% of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) would exit the procurement market if set-
asides were removed. This would lead to a lack of competition that would ultimately 
increase government procurement costs. Marion (2007), Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2011), 
and Hubbard and Paarsch (2009) studied bid preferences for small businesses in 
government contracting. Denes (1997) assessed the cost of small business set-asides in 
federal contracting. Finally, Marion (2009) and Rosa (2020) examined the effect of 
affirmative action via subcontracting goals on government procurement cost. 
Accelerated Payments Policy 
Prompt Payment Act 
The Prompt Payment Act (PPA), originally enacted in 1982 and subsequently revised 
in 1988, set several standards with respect to the speed at which federal contractors are 
paid for work performed or orders fulfilled (FAR 52.232-27, 2021). This act addressed the 
typically slow rate of payment by many federal agencies by setting a maximum time 
between receipt of invoice and payment, while including a series of exceptions that would 
provide even faster payments for particular types of goods. In this section, we describe 
these regulations, as well as the more recent efforts to further accelerate payments to the 
benefit of small business enterprises. 
The PPA specified that for most government procurement, the due date of contractor 
payment is the latter of the “30th day after the designated billing office receives a proper 
invoice from the contractor” or “the 30th day after government acceptance of supplies 
delivered or services performed” (Prompt Payment Act [PPA], 1988). Should the payment 
occur after the 30-day window, the contractor is automatically due interest penalties from the 
federal agency, and the calculation of those penalties is also codified into law. Furthermore, 
the PPA also governs payments by the contractors to its subcontractors. The contractor has 
7 days upon receipt of payment from the government to pay its subcontractors or suppliers, 
provided that the subcontractor has provided satisfactory performance. The subcontractor in 
turn has 7 days to pay its own lower-tier subcontractors or suppliers. 
For some types of goods and services, payments must be made in a much shorter 
time frame than the standard 30-day window, and these exceptions play a key role in 
identifying the impact of accelerated payments in our empirical work. Broadly speaking, the 
exceptions apply to all construction contracts and many types of food products, particularly 
perishable foods. For construction contracts, the payment deadline is 14 days after the 
 
 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Defense Management - 178 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
payment request is made. For food products, suppliers of poultry, eggs, and frozen fish must 
be paid within 7 days. Suppliers of perishable agricultural commodities must be paid within 
10 days. Finally, dairy products and those foods made from edible fats or oils must be paid 
within 10 days.3 For products with a payment period of less than 15 days, the new 
accelerated payment goals should have, at most, a small impact on payment speed. 
Accelerated Payments Policies 
In early 2011, the DoD announced that it was setting new guidelines for the speed of 
payments to its contractors. This policy is codified into Subpart 232.9 of the Defense Federal 
Acquisition Regulations System (DFARS). Initially, the policy applied only to invoice 
payments to small business contractors. Soon after the adoption of accelerated payments 
by the DoD, guidelines from the OMB extended this policy to federal contracting more 
broadly, and accelerated payments were later further expanded to apply to all contracts 
regardless of the size of the contractor. Here, we describe the time line of the policy 
announcement and implementation. 
Defense Acquisition Regulations System (DARS) Memorandum 2011-O0007 was 
issued on April 27, 2011, announcing that the DoD would commence implementation of 
DFARS 232.9303 accelerated payments to small business contractors (Assad, 2011). The 
new policy described a plan to pay contractors within 15 days of submitting a proper invoice. 
The implementation would occur in phases, with the initial phase focusing on the 
modification of the DoD’s largest payment system, the MOCAS system. On June 28, 2011, 
the DoD announced in DARS Memorandum 2011-O00013 that “the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service has completed modifications of MOCAS to provide for these accelerated 
payments to small business” (Ginman, 2011). Payment systems that account for a smaller 
share of DoD contracts followed. The list of payments systems and the dates they were 
implemented is listed in Table 1. 
Table 1. Dates of DoD Payment System Implementation 
 
 
3 This rather broad category includes “liquid milk, cheese, certain processed cheese products, 
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In September 2011, after the initial DoD announcement, the federal government 
announced a directive for all agencies to make accelerated payments to small business 
prime contractors within 15 days of invoice (Lew, 2011). Then, in July 2012, the federal 
government extended the accelerated payments policy to include all federal prime 
contractors—not just small businesses—including those vendors selling to the DoD.4 While 
it is not clear when each particular agency implemented this in practice, the DoD announced 
that its payment systems had incorporated this change in August 2012 (Ginman, 2012). In 
February 2013, the DoD canceled the accelerated payments for large prime contractors, 
and the policy reverted to only accelerating payments for small businesses, though it was 
required to reinstate accelerated payments for large prime contractors in July 2014 (Ginman, 
2013). In summary, accelerated payments was the stated policy of the DoD from April 2011 
onward for small businesses, and from July 2012 until February 2013 and from August 2014 
onwards for large businesses (see Table 2). Accelerated payments was the stated policy of 
federal contracting more broadly from September 2011 onward for small businesses and 
from July 2012 onward for large businesses. 
Evidence presented by the DoD indicates that they complied with the policy: “In 
practice, the Defense Financial Accounting Service (DFAS) currently provides accelerated 
payments to nearly all DoD contractors, as permitted by law” (DoD, 2019). The average time 
to pay an invoice by MOCAS was under 15 days, as of early 2018 (McDuff, 2019). 
Unfortunately, we were not able to find direct evidence about whether other federal agencies 
complied with the policies. The issue of whether or not federal agencies strictly adhered to 
the accelerated payments policies is important and potentially relevant. These policies did 
not carry with them financial penalties for noncompliance. Neither the DoD in its actions 
previously described, nor the broader federal action, altered the rules regarding interest 
penalties for late payments by agencies. Some federal agencies may have, therefore, 
viewed accelerated payments as nonbinding and may not have implemented the policy as 
directed. Only for the DoD, with the pronouncements that MOCAS and other key payments 
systems had been altered, can we say with confidence that the accelerated payments 
policies were in fact implemented. To assess compliance more thoroughly, we would need 
to observe data on time-to-payment. Such data are likely contained within the Contract 
Performance Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), but these data are not publicly 
available, and we were not able to gain access in the time frame of the current project. 
Table 2. Time Line of Accelerated Payments Policies 
 
Date Action Referenced order 
April 2011 DoD accelerated payments for SB primes DARS 2011-O0007 
June 2011 DoD implements acc. pay in MOCAS DARS 2011-O00013 
Sep. 2011 Acc. pay for federal SB primes OMB M-11-32 
July 2012 Acc. pay for all federal primes OMB M-12-16 
Aug. 2012 Implements M-12-16 for DoD primes DARS 2012-O0014 
Feb. 2013 Cancels acc. pay for DoD large primes DARS 2012-O0014 
Aug. 2014 Reinstates for DoD large primes DARS 2014-O0019 
Qualifying as a Small Business 
Which firms qualify as a small business varies substantially across product types. 
The Small Business Administration (SBA) outlines the criteria that are used to determine 
qualification as a small business in federal contracting. The SBA defines threshold values 
 
4 This policy change also inserted a clause directing the prime contractor to accelerate payments 
to their small business subcontractors. It is unclear whether this additional clause was binding, since 
prime contractors were already required to pay any subcontractors within 7 days. 
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for employment and revenue that vary by industry classification of the firm. If either 
employment or revenue exceed these values, the firm does not qualify as a small business. 
The most common thresholds for manufacturing companies are 500 employees and 
average annual revenues of $7.5 million. A majority of firms in the FPDS at one time or 
another are listed as a small business, and small business status can, therefore, change 
over time as a firm expands or contracts. In our empirical work, rather than using a 
dichotomous indicator for small business status, we instead use the fraction of contracts in 
which the firm participated as a small business across all years of the data. 
Data 
Our data come from the universe of contracting actions for Fiscal Years 2010 to 
2015, obtained from the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation (FPDS). All 
unclassified contracts above a mandated minimum value must be reported in this system. 
Contracts are identified by the contracting firm’s Data Universal Number System (DUNS) 
number, a unique firm identifier that allows us to track firms across procurements and form 
firm-specific measures of contract backlog. As mentioned above, backlog is a measure of 
how many contracts a firm has underway at any point in time, and high backlog can limit 
firms’ ability to take on new work. Other important characteristics of a contract that are 
reported in the FPDS are the number of offers, whether the firm is a small business, the 
agency requesting proposals, whether the contract was competitively awarded, the date the 
contract was signed and the date it was effective, and the expected completion date. There 
are also several variables that we use to determine the type of action, including any 
referenced indefinite delivery vehicle (IDV), whether the referenced action is a modification, 
and the reason for this modification. 
These data also provide the product service code, describing the type of product 
provided and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code for the 
associated industry. The good or service being purchased can then be categorized as food, 
construction, or some other type of good, which allows us to determine whether the 
accelerated payments policy was likely to be binding or if the product already had a payment 
time under 15 days. The focus of our empirical work is on new contract awards—not 
revisions, change orders, or exercised options of existing contracts. Our objective is to 
evaluate how accelerated payments affect small business willingness and ability to take on 
new work. This is best reflected in new contracts. For the summary statistics presented in 
this section, and for all the other empirical estimation that follows, the sample of contract 
actions are only new contract awards. 
Types of Contracts 
There are two broad categories of federal contracts, direct contract awards (DCA) 
and task order awards (TOA). A DCA is the simplest type of contract. It is awarded to a 
single vendor, with specifications set by the agency to which funding has been obligated. 
DCAs can be either a definitive contract, which is typically a contract agreeing to purchase a 
good or service that is noncommoditized (i.e., unique), or it can be a purchase order for a 
commoditized good or service. The initial agreement is recorded in FPDS, as well as any 
further modifications to that agreement. 
A TOA is also with a single vendor but is awarded under a broader contract or an 
IDV with that vendor. The IDV is with a particular vendor, and then the vendor can be issued 
delivery orders or purchase agreements under the IDV. The IDV will typically have a ceiling 
on the amount of the order. The FPDS lists detailed information about the broader IDV with 
which the order is associated, as well as each order against that IDV. 
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The distinction between TOAs and DCAs is important to note, as these two types of 
actions need to be treated differently. For the empirical analysis, the most appropriate focus 
is on new DCAs and on orders against existing IDVs that are not simply fulfilling an already-
agreed-upon delivery. The objective of this report is to document whether small businesses 
are able to take on more work and participate in more contracting when accelerated 
payments are in place, and DCAs clearly reflect this. However, it is ambiguous whether a 
new delivery under an existing IDV represents a willingness to take on new work or a vendor 
simply fulfilling prior obligations. On one hand, some IDVs may be under a broader federal 
supply schedule, and when a federal agency orders under this supply schedule, it will buy 
from vendors that are willing to sell. This type of order will, therefore, reflect the firm’s 
contemporaneous interest in supplying the good. On the other hand, with other forms of the 
IDV, such as an indefinite delivery contract, the vendor may have agreed in advance to 
deliver the goods to an agency on demand up to a cap. New orders against this IDV, 
therefore, do not reflect the willingness of the contractor to participate in that moment but 
rather their willingness to participate when the IDV was entered into. 
To evaluate whether an order against an IDV is appropriate for inclusion in the 
empirical analysis, we consider the extent of competition. Specifically, if an order was 
subject to competition, then it suggests that the order was effectively new, and participating 
in the competition reflects the firm’s contemporaneous interest in taking on further work. 
As was described previously, payment periods shorter than 15 days already applied 
for construction services and many types of food products. For procurement of these goods, 
accelerated payments should have no effect. The product and service code (PSC) of the 
product is listed in the data, which allows us to identify those products for which the 
treatment is expected to have no effect. The codes for food are 8905 (meat, poultry, and 
fish); 8910 (dairy, foods, and eggs); 8915 (fruits and vegetables); and 8945 (oils and fats). 
Similarly, accelerated payments policies were not binding for construction contracts, which 
already had payment time frames shorter than 15 days. The PSC can also be used to 
distinguish these contracts. The code Y1 (construction of structures and facilities) includes 
all federal construction work, from roads, bridges, and buildings to fuel supply facilities and 
heating and cooling plants. 
In Table 3, we present the composition of federal IDV contract awards across the 
relevant product categories separately for DoD and non-DoD procurement. In Table 4, we 
present similar figures for DCAs. In the DoD, most new IDV contract actions are not food or 
construction and are, therefore, covered by accelerated payments. The average year sees 
63,351 new IDV food awards and 2,904 construction awards compared with 534,151 
contracts for other types of goods. The dollar value of new IDV contracts is also heavily 
tilted toward non–food and construction, though not to quite the same degree the number of 
contracts. For non-DoD contracts, we see that most IDV awards are neither food nor 
construction. The average year sees 449,104 new IDV awards for goods that would be 
affected by accelerated payments and only 2,439 between perishable food and construction. 
When considering DCAs, we again see that most new contract awards are affected by the 
accelerated payments policy. Within the DoD, only 193 DCAs were made in an average 
year for food products that would be unaffected by accelerated payments. Only 1,696 new 
DoD DCAs are for construction contracts in the average year. These compare to an average 
of 273,825 awards that are affected by accelerated payments.  
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Table 3. Average Annual IDV Actions by Product Type 
 
 
Table 4. Average Annual DCAs by Product Type 
 
Small business participation declines substantially as the size of the award grows. 
Table 5 shows the share of federal contracts awarded to small businesses separately for 
DCAs and IDVs. Across all action types, small businesses are awarded 47% of contracts. 
For most contracts (98.8%), the obligated amount is below $1 million in value. For contracts 
between $10 million and $20 million, 31% go to small businesses. Contracts between $20 
million and $30 million are awarded to small businesses 21% of the time, and this drops to 
just 12% of contracts over $30 million. The pattern is highly pronounced for both DCAs and 
IDVs, though overall IDVs are less frequently awarded to small businesses. 
 
Table 5. Small Business Share of Awards by Obligated Amount 
 
Model of Contract Participation 
In this section, we present a simple model of contract participation. This provides the 
theoretical basis for examining participation as an outcome. In a competitive procurement, 
winning a government contract reflects two factors, the likelihood of entry into the 
competition for the contract and the likelihood of winning the contract conditional on entry. If 
small businesses benefit from accelerated payments, then both of these dimensions will be 
affected. 
A firm’s decision to enter the competition for a contract depends on their expected 
profits. The expected profits are the likelihood that the submitted offer is successful 
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multiplied by the profits the firm will earn if it is awarded the contract:  
E[Π] = Pr(win) ∗ (Π|win). 
If it were costless to participate in the competition for contract, then the firm would 
submit an offer for all contracts where it stood a chance to earn positive expected profits. 
However, submitting an offer is not costless. In addition to the administrative cost of 
preparing a bid, the firm needs to invest time and resources in understanding the contract 
requirements and the cost of meeting those requirements. Let the cost of participating in the 
competition for a contract be K. Entry will occur if the expected profits of entry exceed these 
fixed costs: 
 
E[Π] = Pr(win) ∗ (Π|win) ≥ K. (1) 
Accelerated payments improve both the probability of winning and the profits of the 
firm conditional on winning. In a first-price auction, a commonly used mechanism to award 
government procurement contracts, the probability of winning is Pr(bi < b−i), where b−i 
represents the lowest bid of the firm’s competitors. A widely accepted result in the auction 
literature is that the firm’s optimal bid is monotonically related to its cost (Krishna, 2009). In 
other words, as the firm’s costs decline, the firm is able to submit a lower bid, and the lower 
the bid is, the higher the likelihood that b<b−i. Under accelerated payments, the bidder can 
complete the project more inexpensively because the bidder’s cost of capital is lower since 
they receive payments more quickly. Furthermore, the opportunity cost of taking on the 
project has gone down by expanding the firm’s capacity constraint. Put differently, receiving 
a contract may reduce the firm’s ability to take on other work. This opportunity cost will be 
incorporated into the firm’s bids. So, we expect that if small businesses benefit from 
accelerated payments, then the probability of winning increases for those firms. 
Similarly, the firm’s profits conditional on winning could positively depend on 
accelerated payments as well. The profits upon winning a first-price auction are 
Π|win = b − c 
which is the firm’s bid less its cost. For all the reasons just described, firm cost c declines 
with accelerated payments and, therefore, Π|win increases.  
We also now discuss two added dimensions that we do not model directly. First is 
the role of project backlog. A common finding in the procurement literature is that firms have 
limited capacity, and firms with a backlog of incomplete projects have difficulty taking on new 
work; this can interact with programs that affect the volume of business.5 We anticipate that 
firms with existing projects underway will find accelerated payments particularly valuable, as 
they can take on new work with additional confidence that cash flow will be sufficient to meet 
obligations to suppliers on projects that are already underway. 
A second dimension that we do not model is the possibility that firms may substitute 
across contracts in response to incentives that vary across contracts at a point in time. 
Limited productive capacity to complete the work in the contract, or limited managerial 
capacity to prepare bids, require firms to be selective about the contracts for which they will 
 
5 For instance, Balat (2014) estimated how the effectiveness of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act was affected by the sudden surge of projects when highway construction firms 
have upward sloping marginal cost curves. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) estimated the response 
of forward- looking firms, where contractors anticipate the effect that winning an auction today will 
have on the likelihood of winning future contracts via increased backlog. 
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compete. If the accelerated payments policy makes one type of procurement contract more 
appealing, then this could induce a substitution across procurement auctions. While we do 
not model this phenomenon directly, we will discuss the empirical implications of this issue 
below. 
Empirical Implications 
This simple model illustrates how we can uncover the benefits of accelerated 
payments for small businesses in the federal procurement data. Using the FPDS, we cannot 
measure the profitability of the firm. Nor can we directly measure other outcomes of interest 
that relate to accelerated payments, such as the firm’s cash flow. However, the model 
suggests that we can study the benefits of accelerated payments by examining contract 
awards. Consider again Equation 1. Accelerated payments can increase both terms on the 
left-hand side of the inequality. As both Pr(win) and Π|win increase, the likelihood that the 
firm participates in the bidding for an auction increases. As both participation in competition 
for contracts and the likelihood of winning those contracts increase, then firms will win more 
contracts. Looking at the number of awarded contracts is, therefore, a valid measure of 
whether the accelerated payments policy increases the profits of small businesses. In 
the empirical section, we connect this to the data in two ways. First, we examine the number 
of contract awards by month at the firm level. The hypothesis that we test is whether the 
average small business receives more government contracts in months where accelerated 
payments were in place. In light of the theory discussion above, we separately consider 
firms with and without a backlog of existing projects in order to test whether the benefits of 
accelerated payments depend on the backlog.  
The second outcome we examine is the number of offers made by firms for contracts 
set aside for small businesses. As suggested by Equation 1, the desire to participate in an 
auction should increase under accelerated payments. In general, the data do not contain 
information about the bidders for a contract, only the number of offers submitted. Therefore, 
we are not able to observe the number of bids by small businesses. Many contracts are 
specifically set aside for small businesses. Others are set aside for disadvantaged business 
enterprises, which are a subset of the small businesses. Thus, we can observe the number 
of small businesses that enter the competition for set-aside contracts. 
The question of substitution across auctions is highly relevant here. It is possible that 
accelerated payments increase auction participation of small businesses across the board, 
which would show up in the data as an increase in the number of offers for set-aside 
contracts. Alternatively, accelerated payments could allow small businesses to be more 
competitive for procurement contracts that are open to general competition. Small 
businesses might substitute toward general competition auctions, and set-aside participation 
could, in fact, decline. Even if the accelerated payments policy raises the desire of small 
businesses to participate in the competition for contracts, the predicted impact on the 
number of set-aside offers is ambiguous. 
Empirical Approach 
Using these policy changes described above, we can estimate the effect of 
accelerated payments on small businesses. We do so by examining the participation of 
small businesses in federal contracts and determining whether participation becomes more 
likely when accelerated payments are in place. We take a difference-in-difference (DD) 
approach, examining the difference in small business participation on contracts when 
accelerated payments are in effect compared to times when they are not, and we compare 
this difference to the same difference for large businesses. We also conduct this exercise 
separately for affected and unaffected products. We expect no effect for unaffected 
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products, so performing this estimation is a placebo exercise. If other factors aside from 
accelerated payments were affecting small business participation, then these should be 
witnessed in participation in contracts for placebo products as well. 
We aggregate the data to the firm-month level, so that the variable of interest is the 
number of contracts that a firm is awarded in a given month.6 Doing so creates a data set 
that is too large to be practical—approximately 28 million observations. We therefore take a 
25% random sample of the firms in the data, which leaves 7.2 million firm-month 
observations. Let yit denote the number of contract awards received by firm i in time period 
t. Let YS0 be the average level of participation of small businesses prior to the adoption of 
accelerated payments, and let YS1 be the participation after. The change from the period 
without accelerated payments to after is given by ΔYS = YS1 − YS0. The DD estimate of the 
effect of accelerated payments on small business participation is the difference in this 
change between small and large firms: γ = ∆Y S −  ∆Y L. The linear regression 
specification that yields the DD estimates is as follows: 
yit = β0 + γAt ∗ Si + ρi + φt + ǫit (2) 
 
In this regression, the variable At is an indicator for being in a period of time where 
accelerated payments are in effect, and Si is an indicator for whether firm i is a small 
business. Since small business status can change over time endogenously, when we 
implement this regression specification we instead include the fraction of contracts in which 
the firm participated as a small business. The parameters ρi and φt represent firm and time 
fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient of interest is γ, which is the DD effect of 
accelerated payments on small business contract awards. 
To connect this regression equation to the intuitive description of the DD estimates 
above, the first difference for small firms is ∆YS = E[yi|A = 1,S = 1] − E[yi|A = 0,S = 1], 
with a similar definition for large firms. This difference removes the firm fixed effect, ρi, 
which accounts for all differences across firms that are fixed over time, including any time-
constant effects of being a small business. The second difference is E[∆Y S ] − E[∆Y L]. 
This difference removes any time-specific factors, φt, that affect all firms equally. 
The main confounder in a DD specification is the presence of unobserved time-
varying shocks that differentially affect the treated group. Put differently, if an unobserved 
variable increases small business participation in contracting (and does not impact large 
business participation), and this variable happened to increase in the accelerated payments 
period, then the DD results would be biased in favor of finding an effect. As an example, 
changes in credit availability may differentially affect small businesses, and if credit 
availability changed for some reason during the accelerated payments period, then the 
impact of accelerated payments would also include this effect of credit on participation. This 
concern is difficult to address directly, though it can be addressed indirectly using a placebo 
exercise. We estimate the parameter γ for food and construction contracts separately, 
 
6 We measure participation using the number of contracts rather than the dollar value of those contracts. 
We do so for two reasons. First, there is a close connection between this measure and the theoretical 
concepts discussed above. Second, the measures of contract value in the data may not reflect the 
expected value of the contract. Contractors form expectations regarding change orders, whether the 
options in the contract will be exercised, whether they intend to agree to extra work, and so on. 
Expectations about these variables may be influenced by the accelerated payments policy itself. For 
these reasons, measuring participation by the number of contracts has a clearer interpretation and is 
likely to more accurately measure the underlying theoretical concepts. 
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which should be affected little by accelerated payments, if at all. If there was an unobserved 
shock affecting small businesses in the accelerated payments period, it should show up in 
this estimate. If the estimated γ is instead small and statistically indistinguishable from zero 
for food and construction, then we can rule out this source of bias under the assumption that 
unobserved small business shocks that are correlated with accelerated payments impact all 
firm types equally. 
In practice, there are two treatment periods that are relevant—the time where 
accelerated payments applied only to small businesses and the period where the policy 
applied to all firms. We, therefore, introduce two separate indicators for the accelerated 
payments treatment period rather than a single indicator, Ait. Our expectation is that small 
businesses are impacted more by accelerated payments and, therefore, should see a 
benefit relative to large businesses even when the policy applies to all firms. That said, the 
effects of these two periods on small business contract participation could be different. On 
one hand, expanding the application of accelerated payments to large businesses may 
reduce any advantage in bidding that small firms enjoyed when they alone received 
accelerated payments. On the other hand, the period of time where accelerated payments 
applied only to small businesses was fairly brief. If the policy took time to have an effect, 
then the impact may only be observed during the later treatment period. The reason for a 
delayed impact could be because some DoD payment systems were slow to be converted. 
Alternatively, as previously described, one mechanism for the effect of accelerated 
payments that we explore is the role of a firm’s backlog. Faster payments may improve a 
firm’s ability to take on multiple projects, so the effects of the policy could amplify over time. 
Results 
Small Business Contract Awards 
In this section, we present our main set of results. We show how small business 
contract awards changed during the period of accelerated payments, providing separate 
estimates for DoD contracts versus awards by other federal agencies. We begin by 
providing estimates for all product types together, and we subsequently break the data apart 
by broad product category. 
In Table 6, we present the results for contract awards made by the DoD. In the first 
column of this table, we present the results from regressing the logarithm of the number of 
contract awards made to a firm during a month on the interaction between the small 
business indicator and the two treatment windows. We find very little impact for the average 
small business of the accelerated payments program. The interaction between the small 
business indicator and the first treatment window was negative and very small in 
magnitude.7 It is statistically significant, but it is important to note that this is because the 
coefficient is precisely estimated with over 7 million observations. With 95% confidence, we 
can rule out an effect size smaller than −0.009 log points, which is less than a one 
percentage point effect on contract participation by small businesses. 
The main result masks a heterogeneous effect depending on firm backlog. In 
Columns 2 and 3, we split the sample between firms with and without unfinished contracts. 
For small businesses with a positive amount of backlog, there is a positive and statistically 
significant effect of accelerated payments. The first treatment window has a moderately 
small positive effect—0.026 log points—on the contract awards to small businesses. During 
 
7 In this section, we refer to the period where accelerated payments applied only to small businesses as 
the “first treatment window” and the period where accelerated payments applied to all firms as the 
“second treatment window.” 
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the second treatment window, small businesses saw higher contract awards of 0.064 log 
points compared to when accelerated payments were not in place. For firms without 
backlog, the estimated impact was nearly zero. Compared to the period without accelerated 
payments, the difference in contract awards to small businesses was virtually zero—around 
0.0005 log points. 
In Table 7 we present a similar set of results for other federal agencies. The pattern 
of results is similar, though the effects are much smaller in magnitude than for DoD small 
business contractors. Accelerated payments are associated with a small negative effect on 
log contract awards to small businesses. Though statistically significant, the effect is very 
small and precisely estimated. The difference in small business participation from the time of 
no accelerated payments to the first treatment window is just −0.005 log points, and small 
businesses in the second treatment window receive only −0.0024 fewer log points of 
contracts. As was the case for DoD contractors, any positive effect of accelerated payments 
is observed for firms with a backlog of incomplete contracts. The first treatment window 
effect is 0.011, and the second treatment window effect is 0.026. These point estimates are 
statistically significant and meaningful, yet they are smaller in magnitude than for the DoD. 
The smaller effect of accelerated payments in non-DoD contracts is likely due to the clearer 
implementation of accelerated payments. 
By Product Type 
As previously discussed, accelerated payments policies should have little effect on 
construction contracts and many types of food contracts; these already are paid inside of 15 
days, so a policy of accelerating payments will not be binding. This fact can be used as a 
placebo exercise to verify the results. 
Table 6. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts 
 
In Table 8, we present the results of estimating our base specifications separately for 
contracts for affected versus unaffected products. In the first three columns, we present the 
results for unaffected food and construction contracts. For these contracts, the effect of 
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accelerated payments is extremely small for the average small business. The point 
estimates of the coefficient on the interaction term between the small business indicator and 
the first and second treatment windows are 0.00025 and 0.00018. These coefficient 
estimates are small and precisely estimated. In Column 2, we present the estimates for firms 
with backlog. We see that there is an effect of accelerated payments on the participation of 
small businesses for food and construction contracts. The effect is not as large as the main 
effect found earlier, but it is noticeable. The estimated treatment effect of accelerated 
payments on the participation of small businesses on these contracts is 0.0064 during the 
first treatment window and 0.011 during the second treatment window. It is worth noting that 
even though these products did not directly benefit from accelerated payments, it is still 
possible that firms with backlog could benefit. Such firms would more quickly receive 
payment for the backlog contracts. In Column 3 of Table 8, we find that small businesses 
without backlog had virtually the same likelihood of contract participation during the 
accelerated payments period as when it was not in place. 
In Columns 4 through 6 of Table 8, we present the results for contracts for non–food 
and construction products—those directly affected by the change in payments policy. We 
see that the effects of accelerated payments are strongest for these types of contracts, and 
in particular for participation by firms with backlog. Small businesses with backlog 
experienced an increase in participation by 0.022 log points during the first treatment 
window and 0.056 log points during the second treatment window. It is not surprising that 
these values are close to the main findings presented in Table 6, as most contracts are not 
for construction products or for the subset of food products that already had accelerated 
payments. The important point is that the effect for the affected products is approximately 5 
times as large as the effect for unaffected products. 
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Table 8. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts 
 
Restricting to Active Firms 
One concern with the results just presented is that many firms are not active at a 
particular point in time. Inactive firms will not be affected by accelerated payments, and the 
overall effect of accelerated payments may be larger than what we estimated. In this 
section, we restrict the estimation sample to only active firms, which we define as firms who 
won at least one contract within the same year as the sample observation. In other words, if 
a firm did not win a contract in 2012, we do not include that firm’s 2012 observations in the 
regression. 
In Table 10, we present the base results for the DoD using this restricted sample, 
separately for food/construction and for other types of goods. The results mirror the 
estimates presented in Table 8 but are larger in magnitude. The average effect of 
accelerated payments is estimated to be small and insignificant for food and construction 
products for the average firm. For firms with backlog, there is a statistically significant 
increase in small business participation. Firms without backlog do not witness an increase in 
participation for food or construction contracts. 
In the final three columns of Table 10, we present similar estimates for non–food or 
construction contracts. For the average active firm, the estimated effect of accelerated 
payments is small in magnitude. The active firms with backlog have a substantial increase in 
participation, particularly in the second transfer window. This estimate is larger in magnitude 
than the estimate for all firms. Active small businesses without backlog do not witness an 
increase in contract participation. 
Offers on Set-Aside Contracts 
In this section, we examine the number of offers by small businesses on set-aside 
contracts. If accelerated payments benefit small businesses, we expect that the desire to 
participate in auctions increases. In general, it is not possible to determine the number of 
bids submitted by small businesses by action. Only the total number of offers can be 
determined. With small business set-asides, all bids are presumably from small businesses. 
By examining the number of offers for set-asides, we can then determine whether the 
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Table 9. Log Participation by Firm-Month, Non-DoD Contracts
 
Table 10. Log Participation by Firm-Month, DoD Contracts, Active Firms 
 
One disadvantage of this approach is that it cannot account for substitution across 
set-aside contracts and those with open competition. In particular, accelerated payments 
may allow a small business to participate to a greater extent in open competition auctions. 
However, we expect that accelerated payments should lead to greater bidding participation 
in both set-aside and non–set-aside contracts rather than a substitution between the two. 
Table 11 presents the results. We do not find evidence of an increase in the offers 
for set-aside contracts. This is true when considering all federal set-aside contracts or when 
estimating the effect specifically for DoD contracts. In fact, the opposite held true during the 
second transfer window. For DoD set-aside contracts, fewer offers were made during the 
second treatment window than during the time when accelerated payments were not in 
effect. To the extent that accelerated payments increase the desire of small businesses to 
compete for government contracts, this result suggests that small businesses are 
substituting toward the open competition auctions. 
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Table 11. Number of Offers for Contracts Set-Aside for Small Business 
 
Conclusion 
In this report, we consider the impact of a federal procurement policy that 
accelerated payments to contractors. The policy was initiated by the DoD, first applying only 
to small business contractors. It was later adopted by all federal agencies and subsequently 
extended to all federal contractors regardless of size. Reducing the time between invoice 
and payment is desirable for contractors because of the lag between when costs are 
incurred and payments are received. Firms rely on internal and external sources of capital to 
fill this gap. This poses particular challenges for small businesses, which are likely to have 
lower cash reserves and less access to inexpensive credit. The impact of accelerated 
payments will likely be largest for this set of firms, allowing them to be more competitive for 
contracts and take on additional work. 
Our findings indicate that small businesses participated in more contracts during the 
time when accelerated payments were in place. The estimated effect was stronger for DoD 
contracts, for which the adoption of accelerated payments was apparently more widespread. 
Our empirical design exploits the fact that accelerated payments did not affect all products 
equally; invoice payments for contracts for perishable foods and construction services were 
already accelerated, and the policy should not affect the payment of these goods. We find 
that the modest rise in small business participation after the introduction of accelerated 
payments was observed only in contracts not involving food or construction. 
Our findings lend support to the contention that small businesses benefit from 
accelerated payments. More generally, our findings are also consistent with the hypothesis 
that liquidity constraints pose a greater challenge for small businesses, which suggests that 
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policies such as set-asides that direct more contracts to small businesses may be more 
effective if coupled with policies that alleviate constraints faced by small businesses. 
Further research is called for along two dimensions. First, our conclusions would be 
bolstered by evidence of how the payment behavior of agencies responded to the 
accelerated payments policies. We currently have only indirect evidence on this point. 
Second, evaluating the costs and benefits of accelerated payments would be a key input 
into policy discussions. Conducting such an analysis may require an understanding of the 
long-run effects of policies on small businesses. If the survival and growth of firms is 
enhanced by accelerated payments, then this improves the operation of federal 
procurement markets and should therefore be counted among the benefits of the policy. 
This is a nontrivial exercise that is outside the scope of this report. 
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